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Since Sachs and Warner's (1995a) contribution, there has been a lively
debate on the so-called natural resource curse. This paper re-examines
the e®ects of natural resource abundance on economic growth using new
measures of resource endowment and considering the role of institutional
quality. We ¯nd a positive direct empirical relationship between natural
resource abundance and economic growth. In both OLS and 2SLS re-
gressions, the positive resource e®ects are particularly strong for subsoil
wealth. Our results also show no evidence of negative indirect e®ects of
natural resources through the institutional channel.
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Natural resources seem to have been more of a curse than a blessing for many
countries. Numerous researchers have supported the view that resource-poor
countries often outperform resource-rich countries in economic growth. Sachs
and Warner (1995a)|hereafter referred to as SW|made a major contribution
when they found a negative association between natural resource abundance
and growth in a large cross-country study,1 and a substantial number of papers
has since considered the natural resource curse hypothesis from di®erent points
of view. For example, Auty (1997, 2001) tries to explain the curse historically,
while Ross (2001) and Collier and Hoe²er (2005) focus on the negative associa-
tions between resource abundance and the stability and quality of the political
system.
The explicit consideration of various transmission channels of the e®ects of
natural resource abundance on economic growth has lead to more di®erentiated|
and ambiguous|results. For example, Gylfason (2001) and Bravo-Ortega and
De Gregorio (2005) concentrate on human capital. The ¯rst shows that the neg-
ative growth e®ects of natural resources stem from lower education spending
and less schooling in resource-rich countries. The latter ¯nd that the negative
resource e®ects can in fact be o®set by higher education levels, making nat-
ural resource abundance a boon for countries with high human capital levels.
Torvik (2001) shows that natural resource abundance increases rent-seeking be-
haviour and lowers income; while Manzano and Rigobon (2001) believe that the
real problem for growth is the debt overhang in resource-rich countries. The
Dutch disease hypothesis is examined by Stijns (2003), who con¯rms the typi-
cal sectoral change pattern but ¯nds little evidence for overall negative resource
e®ects on growth; and by Matsen and Torvik (2005), who propose that long-
term growth can be positive provided the savings path is adjusted to take into
account the relative importance of the traded and non-traded goods sectors.
Hausmann and Rigobon (2002) consider the trade structure and show that (ex-
port) diversi¯ed economies are less likely to su®er negative e®ects of natural
resource wealth.2
In this paper, we re-examine two main aspects of the resource curse liter-
ature and ¯nd new cross-country evidence contradicting previous ¯ndings of
detrimental growth e®ects of natural resource wealth. The ¯rst aspect regards
the measurement of natural resource abundance. Most empirical studies con-
¯rming the resource curse published over the past decade have used the SW
(or a similar) measure, which estimates resource abundance based on the share
of primary exports in GDP at the beginning of the observation period. We
evaluate the validity of this indicator and propose some alternatives which in
our view better capture a country's natural resource wealth. The second aspect
concentrates on the importance of institutional quality in the economic growth
and development process. Despite several recent studies showing that \institu-
tions matter" for development (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1995; La Porta et al.,
1The same authors contributed several more studies on the resource curse, see Sachs and
Warner (1999, 2001), as well as Rodriguez and Sachs (1999).
2See Ross (1999) and Stijns (2005) for more extensive literature overviews.
21999; Acemoglu et al., 2001), the role of institutional quality has received only
limited attention in work on growth with resource abundance.3 A brief review
of the literature shows that institutions may however play a critical role in
determining the economic performance of resource-rich economies, and should
therefore be awarded a more prominent place in the analysis.
The results of our cross-country estimations show no evidence of a negative
growth e®ect of natural resource abundance. Using new measures of natural
resource wealth, we instead ¯nd a positive direct association with economic
growth over the period 1970-2000, which is con¯rmed when we consider the
role of institutional quality. The ¯ndings are consistently highly signi¯cant
when we concentrate on mineral resources, which runs contrary to most of the
resource-and-growth literature. Also, our estimations do not con¯rm the nega-
tive e®ects of resource abundance through institutional quality found in several
other studies. Interestingly, adding an interaction term suggests that the ben-
e¯cial resource e®ects diminish as institutional quality increases, although the
overall e®ects remain strongly positive. The positive results hold both in ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations which
consider the endogeneity of institutions, and they are robust to the inclusion of
a wide range of additional control variables from the growth literature.
The next section takes a closer look at various measures of natural resource
abundance used in the literature and proposes some alternatives, and then
discusses the importance of considering institutional quality. Section 3 presents
results of OLS and 2SLS regressions of the levels and growth rates of GDP per
capita on our measures of natural resource endowment and institutional quality,
and section 4 concludes.
2 The natural resource curse hypothesis
2.1 Measuring natural resource abundance
Following Sachs and Warner (1995a), primary exports over GDP have con-
stituted the preferred indicator of natural resource abundance in the natural-
resource-and-growth literature. SW's measure of \resource intensity", sxp, is
easily available and has been employed by numerous researchers who con¯rmed
the negative growth e®ects of natural resource wealth. However, primary ex-
ports seem an unsatisfactory indicator of natural resource abundance for two
main reasons.
First, one should expect any conclusion on a \curse" of natural resource
wealth or abundance to be based on the closest possible approximation of such
wealth|in other words: some measure corresponding to the widely used indica-
tor of economic wealth, income (GDP) per capita. Assuming a strong positive
3A notable recent exception by Robinson et al. (2006) o®ers a rare theoretical explanation
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Figure 1. Natural resource wealth and growth (1970-2000)
Notes: Regression ¯t using World Bank natural wealth data measured in USD per capita (pc). See
appendix for data and regression details.
correlation between natural resource abundance and natural resource exports
is by no means obvious given counter-examples of resource-rich countries with
relatively low primary exports such as Australia and Germany. Moreover, we
could also plausibly argue that a dominant share of primary resource exports
in GDP is a strong indication for an overly specialised economy. Slow growth
in countries with a large share of primary exports may therefore be due more
to a high economic dependence on the natural resource sector rather than a
direct natural resource \curse". Second, it is worth noting that the resource
export variable is quite volatile, suggesting that the period average would in
any case be a better measure than the beginning-of-period value employed in
the literature (Ledermann and Maloney, 2003).4
Empirically, variations in the setup of the resource exports variable have cast
substantial doubt on the resource curse hypothesis. For example, Ledermann
and Maloney (2003) ¯nd positive growth e®ects using the share of primary
exports in total exports and primary exports over total labour force. Davis
(1995) used the share of mineral exports in total merchandise exports as one
of his natural resource proxies, showing a positive relationship with economic
development. Leite and Weidmann (1999) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian
(2003) ¯nd ambiguous growth e®ects when disaggregating resource exports into
agricultural, and fuel and non-fuel mineral products. Neumayer (2004) intro-
duces another variation on the resource curse theme: although still using SW's
4sxp is calculated for 1971, although the observation period in SW is 1970-1989.
4resource exports variable, he takes growth in genuine income, i.e. GDP minus
depreciation of produced capital, as the dependent variable to ¯nd a negative,
albeit weakened, resource e®ect.
Other empirical research does not rely on export data at all, but has in-
stead employed completely di®erent measures of natural resource abundance.
For example, resource rent data have revealed both positive and negative growth
e®ects (Stijns, 2001; Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003). In this group of empirical
work as well, di®erentiating between various types of resources has delivered
interesting results. When classi¯ed by indices, economies dependent on \point-
source" resource extraction|i.e. minerals and plantation crops characterised by
localised, intensive production|often show evidence of worse economic perfor-
mance and institutions than economies dependent on more \di®use" resources,
i.e. characterised by more extensive production (Isham et al., 2005). Mineral
production over GDP however delivers less clearcut results: using this mea-
sure, Davis (1995) ¯nds a positive relationship with economic growth, while
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) ¯nd both positive and negative growth e®ects,
with the negative ones prevailing. Fuel and non-fuel mineral reserve and pro-
duction data, as well as land endowment|all measured per 1'000 inhabitants|
again show ambiguous e®ects on economic growth (Stijns, 2005). Finally, Ding
and Field (2005) use World Bank data on natural resource wealth to re-estimate
SW's basic regression, as well as a three-equation model to consider the e®ects
of resources on human capital. They ¯nd negative growth e®ects of natural
resources as a share of total produced capital, and positive growth e®ects of
natural resources per capita; but both indicators become insigni¯cant in the
three-equation model. However, their simple approach leaves many open ques-
tions on the robustness of the results.
Hence, as a ¯rst step in re-examining the hypothesis of a curse of natu-
ral resource abundance|as opposed to the curse of a dependence on natural
resource exports actually found by much of the literature|we compare SW's
primary exports indicator sxp with several alternative measures of natural re-
source endowment. We collected data on fuel and non-fuel mineral production
in 1970 from the World Mineral Statistics (IGS, 1978) and British Petroleum
(for natural gas), and used them both separately and as an aggregate, denoted
by fuelmin, nonfuelmin, and min, respectively. Additionally, these indicators
were calculated as per capita (pc) measures and as shares of 1970 GDP (gdp)
to give a better indicator of their relative importance. We also employ natural
resource wealth data recently published by the World Bank (1997, 2005). The
World Bank natural resource indicators value di®erent components of natural
wealth in USD per capita on the basis of the net present value of rents and are
available for 1994 and 2000. We use the average measure over the two years
available to minimise possible measurement errors and price °uctuations in the
calculations.5
5Ding and Field (2005) made use of the total natural capital data for 1994. Natural re-
sources valued by the World Bank in both its studies include subsoil assets (fuel and non-fuel
minerals), timber resources, non-timber forest resources, protected areas, cropland, pasture-
land, and total natural capital. The partial indicators of forest and agricultural wealth gave

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6Figure 1 illustrates the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression ¯ts of two
of these new measures on economic growth between 1970-2000 (detailed basic
estimation results can be found in Appendix A). Clearly, there is no longer a
negative association suggesting a curse of natural resource abundance: on the
contrary, we now observe a signi¯cant positive relationship, especially when we
consider the evidence for per capita subsoil wealth.
To better understand how di®erent measures of resource endowment can de-
liver radically di®erent estimation results, we calculate the correlations between
SW's measure of natural resource wealth at the beginning of the observation
period, beginning-of-period mineral production data, and the World Bank in-
dicators for total natural wealth and subsoil assets per capita. It is obvious
from the results in Table 1 that sxp is not correlated with other measures of
natural resource wealth at conventional levels of signi¯cance (column (1)). Put
di®erently, the amounts of primary exports are clearly not a reliable indicator
of a country's relative natural resource wealth.
On the other hand, the correlations between the World Bank indicators|per
capita subsoil assets subsoil and total natural capital natcap|and per capita
mineral production and mineral production over GDP are consistently positive
and highly signi¯cant.6 There are several reasons why the World Bank data
would deliver the most reliable measures of relative natural resource abundance,
and hence the best measures for testing the resource curse hypothesis. For one,
data quality on mineral production for the early 1970s is not uniform, and un-
weighted production data are unsatisfactory proxies for natural resource wealth
as they make no distinction between the value of di®erent minerals.7 Moreover,
mineral production is more likely to be a®ected by the levels of technology in
a country. This endogeneity is assumed less of a problem for the World Bank
data, as they rely more on the own Bank's estimates as opposed to countries'
sometimes questionable published statistics.8 And ¯nally, these measures of
natural resource wealth are deemed the best parallel to the economic wealth
indicator of income per capita.
In our estimations, we will use the World Bank's per capita natural resource
data to test their e®ect on economic growth over the period 1970-2000. We will
also compare the results with those reached using sxp.
2.2 Natural resources and institutional quality
Several recent contributions have stressed the importance of institutional qual-
ity for economic development (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Hall
6This also suggests that the countries' natural resource wealth, measured by their mineral
abundance (subsoil assets) and total natural capital, has changed relatively little over the past
three decades, con¯rming the hypothesis of Gylfason (2001).
7For example, one additional tonne of sulphur has the same production e®ect as one ad-
ditional tonne of gold. Assigning weights to the minerals extracted is however equivalent to
estimating their monetary value.
8Nevertheless, the correlation between technology levels and natural resource abundance
estimates is considered in the robustness tests in section 3.3 below.
7and Jones, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001). But in quantita-
tive work on the resource curse hypothesis, the institutional channel has seldom
been veri¯ed with much success, although it has frequently been mentioned as
an important potential cause of the curse. Institutional quality is often sim-
ply controlled for by using a measure of corruption (e.g. Sachs and Warner,
1995a; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004). Notable exceptions are given by Bulte
et al. (2005) and Mehlum et al. (2006). The ¯rst ¯nd that natural resource
abundance, and especially mineral resources, have an ambiguous direct e®ect on
several measures of human development, and a slightly negative indirect e®ect
via two measures of institutional quality. The latter show that the interaction of
natural resource abundance with high-quality institutions|measured by an ag-
gregate indicator|has a positive growth e®ect, while the direct negative growth
e®ect of resource wealth seems to persist. However, these results are based on
resource exports data, which pose the problems already discussed above: we
contend that they more accurately depict the e®ects of natural resource exports
dependence.
From a more qualitative angle, historians, political scientists, and economists
generally agree that the presence of abundant natural resources (especially min-
erals) leads to rent-seeking behaviour and corruption, thereby decreasing the
quality of government, which in turn negatively a®ects economic performance
(e.g. Auty, 2001; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Isham et al., 2005).9 Robinson
et al. (2006) develop a political economy model which shows that the impact
of \resource boom" crucially depends on the quality of the political institu-
tions, and in particular the degree of clientelism in the public sector. Countries
with worse-quality institutions are more likely to su®er from a resource curse.
There is also evidence that natural resource abundance considerably increases
the potential of violent civil con°ict (Collier and Hoe²er, 2005). Empirically,
rent-seeking due to natural resources has been shown to be non-linear, both
with respect to income and the total amount of resources in a country. In his
cross-country study, Ross (2001) ¯nds that the negative resource e®ects of min-
eral abundance on institutions decline with increasing income levels and with
greater past mineral exports. And in their case study of Nigeria, Sala-i-Martin
and Subramanian (2003) describe how \oil corrupts and excess oil corrupts more
than excessively". They stress that the natural resource curse only holds for
mineral|and particularly oil|abundance, and not agricultural products and
food (all measured by their respective export shares).
In a di®erent vein, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) show that natural resource
abundance may have negative e®ects on development when weak institutions
allow resource pro¯ts to be spent in government consumption rather than in-
vestment, especially in countries with low levels of genuine saving. Stijns (2005)
contends that there are both positive and negative channels through which nat-
ural resource abundance a®ects economic growth; he ¯nds that land abundance
tends to have negative e®ects on all determinants of growth, including di®erent
measures of institutional quality, while the e®ects of mineral abundance are
9For formal models of rent-seeking behaviour, see Tornell and Lane (1999) and Torvik
(2001).
8Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Log growth of income per capita,
average 1970-2000 (g7000) 102 2.44 0.80 ¡0:13 4.26
Log total natural capital in US$ per
capita, average 1994-2000 (lnnatcap) 84 8.36 0.92 6.59 10.76
Log subsoil wealth in US$ per capita,
average 1994-2000 (lnsubsoil) 63 5.76 2.41 ¡0:69 10.46
Primary exports / GDP in 1971 (sxp) 114 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.89
Rule of law, average 1996-2000
(ruleoflaw) 158 2.54 1.0 0:67 4.74
Government e®ectiveness, average
1996-2000 (goveffect) 165 2.52 0.99 0:19 5.01
Note: Variable sources and detailed descriptions are given in the appendix.
less clearcut. He concludes that \learning processes" are the crucial element in
determining the direction of in°uence of resource wealth on growth, i.e. how
countries exploit and develop their resources. Acemoglu et al. (2001) question
the resource curse hypothesis even further when they ¯nd no signi¯cant income
e®ect of natural resource abundance at all, con¯rming their view that institu-
tional quality alone can explain a great deal of the cross-country di®erences in
economic development.
From the literature, it emerges that the growth and development e®ects of
natural resource abundance are rather ambiguous when institutional quality
is included in the analysis; there may in fact only be a curse when natural
resource wealth occurs together with low-quality institutions. In this paper, we
will explore this possibility by focusing both on natural resource abundance and
on institutional quality. We use two di®erent institutional quality indicators,
namely measures for the rule of law and government e®ectiveness (described
below), and interact them with our resource abundance measures; in a second
step we instrument for them to account for the possible endogeneity of the
quality of institutions themselves, including the possibility that natural resource
abundance negatively a®ects institutions.
3 Natural resources, institutions, and growth: re-
sults of cross-country estimations
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables. Average growth
of per capita income between 1970-2000 is PPP adjusted (detailed variable
descriptions and sources are provided in the Appendix). This will be the de-
pendent variable for the subsequent estimations. It is evident from the data
that the growth di®erences in the sample of roughly 100 countries are quite
9large, with a standard deviation in log per capita income growth of 0.8. Rows
2-3 describe the logs of the natural resource abundance indicators introduced
above, namely total natural capital and subsoil wealth per capita, respectively,
averaged over 1994-2000. The di®erences in subsoil wealth between the coun-
tries in the sample are particularly remarkable, with a standard deviation of
2:39. SW's natural resource indicator sxp is described in row 4.
The last two rows show the main variables used to measure institutional
quality. The World Bank recently compiled a list of six governance indicators
measuring di®erent dimensions of governance from 1996 onwards (Kaufmann et
al., 2005; also included in the World Development Indicators). These indicators
are all positively correlated amongst each other, as well as with measures of
institutional quality used in the growth literature (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1995;
La Porta et al., 1999; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).10 The main advantages
of the World Bank indicators lie in their objectivity|provided by a very broad
survey sample which includes and adds to the sources for earlier indicators|
and the excellent country coverage. From the six indicators, we chose two
which closely resemble those used in other studies and averaged them over
1996-2000.11 ruleo°aw measures the quality of contract enforcement, of the
police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; gove®ect
measures the quality of the bureaucracy and of public services. Again, the data
report a wide variety in the level of rule of law and government e®ectiveness
between the countries, considering that the estimates range from zero to 5, with
institutional quality increasing with the value of the indicator.
3.2 Ordinary least squares regressions
To better compare the growth e®ects of di®erent natural resource measures,
we begin with standard cross-country OLS regressions of the type used in the
resource curse literature. The idea is that economic growth between t=1970






t ), is a function
of a vector of explanatory variables, including the natural logarithm of natural
resource abundance Ri, and institutional quality INSTi.
Table 3 presents results of the linear regressions for12
Gi = ®0 + ®1Y i
70 + ®2Ri + ®3INSTi + ®4Zi + ²i (1)
where Y is the log of income per capita in 1970 (our basic control for the
growth regressions, as in SW and subsequent estimations), R and INST are
10Correlations with several other measures of institutional quality, including indicators for
the beginning of the sample period are shown in Appendix B. They con¯rm the view that
institutions have remained relatively stable over the last decades, and also diminishes the
disadvantage of not having earlier data for our estimations. Results for the remaining World
Bank indicators were very similar for all regressions and are available upon request.
11For example, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) recently found that institutions a®ecting
the relations between the government and individuals (¯rms) had a more signi¯cant e®ect
on economic development than those a®ecting relations between individuals (¯rms). Their
favored \top-down" measure property rights closely corresponds to our rule of law measure.
12The results of simple OLS regressions using only our natural resource variables lnnatcap
and lnsubsoil and the SW variable sxp are presented in Appendix A.
10Table 3. OLS regressions: natural resources, institutions, and growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A
lgdp70 ¡0:31¤¤ ¡0:62¤¤¤ ¡0:63¤¤¤ ¡0:75¤¤¤ ¡0:85¤¤¤ ¡0:86¤¤¤ ¡0:93¤¤¤
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18)
sxp ¡0:65
(0.42)
lnnatcap 0:20¤¤ 0:20¤¤ 0.08
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
lnsubsoil 0:15¤¤¤ 0:16¤¤¤ 0:13¤¤¤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
ruleo°aw 0:48¤¤¤ 0:73¤¤¤ 0:71¤¤¤ 0:69¤¤¤ 0:81¤¤¤ 0:69¤¤¤ 0:67¤¤¤
(0.14) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16)










Adj.R2 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.58
N 67 79 79 79 61 61 61
Panel B
lgdp70 ¡0:16 ¡0:59¤¤¤ ¡0:59¤¤¤ ¡0:68¤¤¤ ¡0:85¤¤¤ ¡0:87¤¤¤ ¡0:87¤¤¤
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
sxp ¡0:98¤¤
(0.45)
lnnatcap 0:19¤ 0:2¤ 0.07
(0.10) (0.10) (0.1)
lnsubsoil 0:14¤¤¤ 0:15¤¤¤ 0:12¤¤¤
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
gove®ect 0:32¤¤ 0:72¤¤¤ 0:68¤¤¤ 0:67¤¤¤ 0:86¤¤¤ 0:73¤¤¤ 0:67¤¤¤
(0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16)










Adj.R2 0.20 0.29 0.28 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.59
N 69 79 79 79 61 61 61
Notes: Dependent variable is log income growth 1970-2000. Standard errors in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤
statistically signi¯cant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Joint signi¯cance tests strongly reject
hypothesis of no di®erence between covariates in all estimations. For detailed variable descriptions
and sources see appendix.
the natural resource abundance and institutional quality variables, respectively,
Z is a vector of other covariates, and ² is a random error term. Throughout the
paper, we are particularly interested in the coe±cient ®2. Since we use logs,
the e®ect of natural resource abundance on income growth is expressed as an
elasticity.
Panel A in Table 3 shows the results of estimations using the rule of law
as the main institutional indicator, while Panel B reports the results using
government e®ectiveness. Column (1) shows a negative but not very signi¯cant
e®ect of natural resource abundance on growth when using the SW indicator
sxp. Columns (2)-(4) show a weakly signi¯cant positive in°uence of natural
resource abundance on growth when using per capita natural capital, which
disappears when we control for regional e®ects (Europe and Central Asia is the
omitted region throughout the estimations). Columns (5)-(7) however show
that an abundance of subsoil wealth has a consistent and highly signi¯cant
11Table 4. OLS regressions with interaction terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
lgdp70 ¡0:24¤ ¡0:78¤¤¤¡0:84¤¤¤¡0:88¤¤¤¡0:95¤¤¤ ¡0:08 ¡0:75¤¤¤¡0:76¤¤¤¡0:91¤¤¤ ¡0:9¤¤¤
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)
sxp ¡3:4¤¤¤ ¡3:84¤¤¤
(1.01) (1.29)
lnnatcap 1:25¤¤¤ 1:00¤¤¤ 1:23¤¤¤ 0:96¤¤¤
(0.26) (0.23) (0.29) (0.26)
lnsubsoil 0:37¤¤¤ 0:37¤¤¤ 0:36¤¤¤ 0:31¤¤¤
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
ruleo°aw 0.15 3:66¤¤¤ 3:34¤¤¤ 1:26¤¤¤ 1:18¤¤¤
(0.15) (0.7) (0.63) (0.25) (0.24)
gove®ect ¡0:03 3:64¤¤¤ 3:23¤¤¤ 1:34¤¤¤ 1:22¤¤¤
(0.15) (0.79) (0.72) (0.25) (0.25)
interaction 1:08¤¤ ¡0:33¤¤¤ ¡0:3¤¤¤ ¡0:08¤¤¤¡0:07¤¤¤ 1:12¤¤ ¡0:33¤¤¤¡0:29¤¤¤¡0:09¤¤¤¡0:08¤¤¤
(0.41) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.50) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03)
latitude 0.55 0.67 0.70 0.75
(0.64) (0.7) (0.67) (0.64)
Africa&ME ¡0:68¤¤¤ ¡0:71¤¤¤ ¡0:85¤¤¤ ¡0:68¤¤ ¡0:65¤¤ ¡0:74¤¤¤
(0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26)
Asia&Ocean. 0.19 0.15 ¡0:15 0.21 0.28 ¡0:03
(0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.26) (0.24)
N.Am. 0.82 0.46 0.14 0.41 0.38 0.09
(0.62) (0.34) (0.34) (0.73) (0.36) (0.34)
C.&S.Am. ¡0:26 ¡0:05 ¡0:27 ¡0:41 ¡0:03 ¡0:25
(0.24) (0.24) (0.28) (0.29) (0.26) (0.28)
Adj.R2 0.51 0.45 0.58 0.53 0.63 0.37 0.4 0.54 0.56 0.64
N 67 79 79 61 61 69 79 79 61 61
Notes: Dependent variable is log income growth 1970-2000. Standard errors in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤
statistically signi¯cant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Joint signi¯cance tests strongly reject
hypothesis of no di®erence between covariates in all estimations. For detailed variable descriptions
and sources see appendix.
positive e®ect on economic growth. All other things equal, the results would
imply that an increase in per capita subsoil wealth would have a fairly large
positive growth e®ect if we were to assume a direct causality. On average, a
one-percent increase in dollarised per capita subsoil assets would have meant
up to 0.16 percent more income growth over the period. The ¯ndings suggest
that the use of sxp as the preferred measure of natural resource abundance may
have led to a negative bias in the literature.
In all estimations, the institutional quality indicators are positive and highly
signi¯cant, con¯rming the view that \institutions matter". The coe±cients
for our rule-of-law and government-e®ectiveness measures suggest that a one-
point increase on the institutional quality index would have had a large positive
growth e®ect on average, again assuming a direct causal relationship.13 The
highly signi¯cant negative coe±cients for initial income throughout the growth
estimations are in accordance with the convergence literature.14
13For example, the result from column (2) suggests that in case of a one-point improvement
on the rule-of-law index, we could have observed a ceteris paribus average growth increase
of 100 ¤ [exp(0:73 ¤ 1) ¡ 1] = 107:5% over the period. Obviously, this e®ect is extreme even
considering that one point on the institutional quality scale corresponds to a very substantial
institutional improvement. Given this caveat, the coe±cients found in subsequent estimations
con¯rm the large positive growth e®ects of sound institutions.
14As an interesting aside, latitude proves insigni¯cant in our estimations, running counter
to the hypothesis that geographical and climatic factors, determined by distance from the
equator, have an important direct e®ect on economic growth (see also 2SLS regressions below).
12OLS estimations with interaction terms A question which naturally
arises is how resource abundance and institutional quality interact. Although
natural resources may have positive growth e®ects in general, the results so far
could have been driven by resource-rich countries with high-quality institutions.
To investigate this possibility, we insert an interaction term between our natural
resource abundance and institutional quality measures in the basic regression
equation (1) and again compare them with the SW indicator of primary exports
over GDP, sxp.
The results are shown in Table 4. First, we note that the coe±cients on our
natural resource and institutional quality measures retain their expected signs;
their signi¯cance in fact seems reinforced. But the interaction terms appear
signi¯cantly negative throughout the estimations, suggesting that the positive
growth e®ects diminish as institutional quality improves. And conversely, from
columns (1) and (6) we see that higher institutional quality appears to reinforce
the negative growth e®ects of the GDP share of primary exports, con¯rming the
¯ndings of Mehlum et al. (2006). So have countries with high-quality institu-
tions relied less on the positive growth impulses of natural resource abundance
for the development of their economy, generating a sort of \convergence e®ect"
with regard to institutions? Institutional quality and income levels are posi-
tively correlated; consequently, to test this \institutional convergence" hypoth-
esis, we re-estimated the regressions allowing initial GDP per capita to interact
with our resource abundance measures. The interaction terms again turned
up with a negative sign, con¯rming that more institutionally and economically
developed countries have on average experienced weaker positive growth e®ects
of resource wealth.15
We can therefore explain the negative interaction coe±cients in Table 4; but
what of the positive ¯ndings on the growth e®ects of natural resource abundance
found so far? In fact, our overall results do not change much with the interaction
terms: natural resource abundance still has a signi¯cantly positive in°uence on
economic growth. To show this, we can calculate the total resource e®ects
for interesting values of our institutional quality measures|as the coe±cients
in Table 4 correspond to an e®ect with zero, i.e. unrealistically bad, quality
institutions. For example, using the results from column (2), we can take
the sample mean of the quality of rule of law to obtain the average e®ect of
a one-percent increase in natural resources per capita on a country's growth
as 1:25 ¡ (0:33 ¤ 2:54) = 0:41 percent. This is twice as high as the e®ect
we found previously without interaction terms! Similarly, from column (4)
a one-percent increase in mineral resources gives us a total growth e®ect of
0:37¡(0:08¤2:54) = 0:17 percent, an e®ect similar in magnitude to that found
in earlier estimations above. On the other hand, sxp still has negative overall
growth e®ects, namely around ¡0:66 (column (1)).
However, it is possible that the institutional indicators in our OLS estima-
tions su®er from endogeneity due to omitted variable e®ects. If indeed there is
resource-induced rent-seeking behaviour, leading to corruption among govern-
15I thank Geo®rey Heal and David Popp for suggesting this hypothesis test. Results of
these additional regressions are available upon request.
13Table 5. Determinants of institutions




latitude 2:53¤¤¤ 4:09¤¤¤ 2:67¤¤¤ 4:30¤¤¤ 2:91¤¤¤
(0.37) (0.36) (0.4) (0.35) (0.42)
polity70 0:08¤¤¤ 0:07¤¤¤ 0:04¤¤¤ 0:08¤¤¤ 0:04¤¤¤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
lnnatcap 0:26¤¤¤ 0:04 0:30¤¤¤ ¡0:04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.1) (0.09)
lnsubsoil 0:07¤¤ 0:01 0:05 ¡0:04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
lgdp70 0:51¤¤¤ 0:47¤¤¤ 0:73¤¤¤ 0:80¤¤¤
(0.09) (0.1) (0.09) (0.10)
Adj.R2 0.22 0.71 0.79 0.74 0.81 0.32 0.49 0.71 0.39 0.7




latitude 2:61¤¤¤ 3:91¤¤¤ 2:59¤¤¤ 4:06¤¤¤ 2:71¤¤¤
(0.35) (0.34) (0.38) (0.35) (0.42)
polity70 0:08¤¤¤ 0:06¤¤¤ 0:02¤¤ 0:07¤¤¤ 0:02¤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
lnnatcap 0:26¤¤¤ 0.06 0:34¤¤¤ ¡0:01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.1) (0.08)
lnsubsoil 0:08¤¤¤ 0:03 0:08 ¡0:02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
lgdp70 0:47¤¤¤ 0:45¤¤¤ 0:75¤¤¤ 0:82¤¤¤
(0.09) (0.1) (0.09) (0.10)
Adj.R2 0.25 0.71 0.79 0.73 0.79 0.30 0.44 0.69 0.33 0.67
N 165 84 84 63 63 128 83 83 62 62
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Standard errors in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ statistically signi¯cant at
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For detailed variable descriptions and sources see appendix.
ment o±cials, then natural resource wealth itself may be negatively correlated
with institutions and outweigh the positive direct growth in°uence. These fac-
tors are not su±ciently accounted for in OLS, which is why in the next subsec-
tion we proceed to ¯nd an instrument for the institutional variation which has
no direct e®ect on economic growth, and then perform two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimations.
3.3 Two-stage least squares regressions
Equation (1) described the relationship between natural resource wealth and
institutional quality on one side, and economic growth on the other. In addition
we have
INSTi = ¯0 + ¯1Ri + ¯2Li + ¯3Zi + ºi; (2)
where INST is our measure of institutional quality, now the dependent variable,
R is again the natural resource abundance measure, L is our main instrument
for institutional quality, Z is the vector of covariates a®ecting all variables, and
º is the random error term.
Table 5 presents OLS regressions for equation (2) using two di®erent po-
tential instruments for the rule-of-law (Panel A) and government-e®ectiveness
indicator (Panel B). In columns (1)-(5) we regress latitude, calculated on a scale
from 0 to 1, against our institutional quality measures. There have been several
studies on the link between latitude and economic development, but there is no
14widely accepted explanation for the observed correlation. We follow Hall and
Jones (1999) in assuming that the direct e®ect of a country's latitude on its
economic performance is zero and that any observed in°uence appears only via
the institutional channel. This assumption is strengthened by the observation
that latitude becomes statistically insigni¯cant in our OLS estimations once
institutional quality is controlled for (see Tables 3-4).
Column (1) shows that latitude alone accounts for up to one quarter of the
variation in our institutional quality measures, and it remains highly signi¯cant
when adding other covariates (columns (2)-(5)). Columns (2)-(5) show that
natural resource abundance has a positive e®ect on institutional quality; the
e®ect is however not robust to controlling for initial income, although the sign
remains positive.16
Columns (6)-(10) show the results of the regressions using a regime index
for a country's political system in 1970 (polity70). The index is taken from
the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) and classi¯es a regime on a
scale of ¡10 (institutionalised autocracy) to 10 (institutionalised democracy).
The polity measure alone explains nearly one third of our institutional quality
variation (column (6)), but is less robust to the inclusion of other variables
than latitude. In addition, polity is a complex composite index and could
su®er from measurement error as well as lack of objectivity; and it is probably
itself endogenous and correlated with income. We will therefore use latitude in
the speci¯cation for the ¯rst stage of our two-stage least squares estimations.
Interestingly, natural resource abundance has ambiguous e®ects on institutional
quality in the estimations using the polity index, although the results are not
very signi¯cant (columns (7)-(10)).
Equations (1) and (2) form the basis for the two-stage least squares regres-
sions presented in Table 6. Equation (2) is our ¯rst stage for the institutional
quality measures, shown in Panel B; equation (1) is the second stage, shown in
Panel A. The results con¯rm those found in the OLS regressions, both regarding
the sign and the magnitude of the coe±cients of interest. The broad measure
of natural resource abundance, natural capital per capita, has a positive direct
e®ect on economic growth in the period observed. But this e®ect practically
disappears when we control for regions, suggesting that most of the positive
growth e®ect of natural capital is limited to certain areas of the world.17 The
indirect e®ect via the institutional channel is statistically even weaker.
Subsoil wealth, on the other hand, has a highly signi¯cant positive direct
e®ect on growth, while the indirect e®ect is once more very weak. Again, this is
especially interesting as much of the resource-and-growth literature has found
highly signi¯cant negative growth e®ects of mineral resources, in particular.
16Nevertheless, we believe that these ¯ndings cast doubt on the rent-seeking hypothesis:
natural resource abundance does not necessarily lead to worse institutions, especially since we
found the same results using a measure of corruption as the institutional quality indicator.
Resource wealth may have a corruptive e®ect in poorer and more autocratic countries, a
possibility suggested by the ¯ndings using the polity indicator (below); but determining the
exact nature of this indirect causal relationship goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
17The results show that resource-rich African and Middle Eastern economies in particular
have performed much worse than European and Central Asian ones (Europe and Central Asia
being the omitted region).
15Table 6. 2SLS regressions: natural resources, institutions, and growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A
2SLS
lnnatcap 0:20¤¤ 0.08 0:19¤ 0:06
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.1)
lnsubsoil 0:16¤¤¤ 0:13¤¤¤ 0:14¤¤¤ 0:12¤¤¤
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
ruleo°aw 0:76¤¤¤ 0:69¤¤ 0:96¤¤¤ 0:67¤
(0.21) (0.32) (0.19) (0.34)
gove®ect 0:79¤¤¤ 0:8¤¤ 1:04¤¤¤ 0:90¤¤
(0.22) (0.38) (0.21) (0.43)
lgdp70 ¡0:65¤¤¤ ¡0:75¤¤¤ ¡0:99¤¤¤ ¡0:9¤¤¤ ¡0:65¤¤¤ ¡0:77¤¤ ¡1:02¤¤¤ ¡1:04¤¤¤
(0.21) (0.28) (0.20) (0.31) (0.22) (0.3) (0.21) (0.34)
Africa&ME ¡0:84¤¤¤ ¡0:93¤¤¤ ¡0:75¤¤ ¡0:75¤
(0.31) (0.31) (0.34) (0.37)
Asia&Ocean. 0.07 ¡0:16 0.17 ¡0:09
(0.27) (0.26) (0.28) (0.26)
N.Am. 0.20 ¡0:11 0.13 ¡0:12
(0.40) (0.38) (0.4) (0.38)
C.&S.Am. ¡0:04 ¡0:27 0.08 ¡0:09
(0.39) (0.44) (0.45) (0.53)
Panel B
1st stage
latitude 2:68¤¤¤ 1:98¤¤¤ 2:85¤¤¤ 1:93¤¤¤ 2:57¤¤¤ 1:72¤¤¤ 2:62¤¤¤ 1:53¤¤¤
(0.4) (0.48) (0.42) (0.47) (0.38) (0.47) (0.42) (0.51)
lnnatcap 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
lnsubsoil 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
lgdp70 0:51¤¤¤ 0:64¤¤¤ 0:50¤¤¤ 0:67¤¤¤ 0:49¤¤¤ 0:59¤¤¤ 0:49¤¤¤ 0:61¤¤¤
(0.09) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Africa&ME ¡0:01 ¡0:03 ¡0:15 ¡0:26
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.37)
Asia&Ocean. 0.32 0:34¤ 0.13 0:13
(0.22) (0.2) (0.21) (0.22)
N.Am. ¡0:31 ¡0:31 ¡0:18 ¡0:21
(0.28) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27)
C.&S.Am. ¡0:39¤ ¡0:51¤¤ ¡0:51¤¤ ¡0:64¤¤¤
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24)
Adj.R2 0.8 0.83 0.82 0.87 0.8 0.82 0.81 0.85
N 79 79 61 61 79 79 61 61
Notes: Dependent variable in 2SLS is log income growth 1970-2000; dependent variable in ¯rst stage
is ruleoflaw in columns (1)-(4) and goveffect in columns (5)-(8). Standard errors in parentheses.
¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ statistically signi¯cant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For detailed variable
descriptions and sources see appendix.
But our results consistently show that on average a one-percent increase in
per capita subsoil wealth in a country would have directly increased average
economic growth by up to 0.16 percent over the period, all other things equal.
This closely corresponds to the previous ¯ndings in the simple OLS regressions.
These results challenge the resource curse hypothesis: neither a broadly con-
structed measure of natural resource wealth, nor a narrower measure of mineral
wealth show a negative e®ect on economic growth. On the contrary, the empir-
ical results point to a signi¯cant positive e®ect of natural resource abundance,
especially for mineral resources, which is con¯rmed when we consider institu-
tional quality and its possible endogeneity. In other words, natural resources|
and particularly mineral resources|seem to have robust direct positive e®ects
even when we explicitly control for institutional quality and possible interac-
tions. We also ¯nd no conclusive evidence of a negative indirect growth e®ect of
natural resource abundance via institutional quality, apparently contradicting
the rent-seeking hypothesis.
Consistent with the hypothesis that \institutions matter", our institutional
quality measures remain positive and signi¯cant even when accounting for en-
16Table 7. 2SLS growth regressions with additional control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A 2SLS
with ruleo°aw
lnnatcap 0:25¤¤ 0:20¤¤ 0.13 0:17 0:11
(0.1) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
lnsubsoil 0:17¤¤¤ 0:14¤¤¤ 0:15¤¤¤ 0:16¤¤¤ 0:16¤¤¤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ruleo°aw 0:46¤ 0:61¤¤¤ 0:6¤¤ 0:88¤¤¤ 0:46 0:71¤¤¤ 0:81¤¤¤ 0:92¤¤¤ 0:83¤¤¤ 0:52¤
(0.24) (0.2) (0.25) (0.31) (0.41) (0.23) (0.19) (0.27) (0.22) (0.28)
lgdp70 ¡0:56¤¤¤¡0:54¤¤¤¡0:85¤¤¤ ¡0:75¤¤ ¡0:77¤¤¤ ¡0:89¤¤¤¡0:85¤¤¤¡1:02¤¤¤¡0:87¤¤¤¡0:65¤¤¤
(0.21) (0.29) (0.18) (0.29) (0.26) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.2)
ethnic fract. ¡1:07¤¤¤ ¡0:28 ¡0:82¤¤ ¡0:48
(0.39) (0.49) (0.4) (0.42)
lpop70 0:17¤¤¤ 0:12¤¤ 0:16¤¤¤ 0:13¤¤
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
schooling 0:15¤¤ 0:15¤ 0:03 0:00
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
openness ¡0:02 ¡0:1 ¡0:13 -0.19
(0.23) (0.23) (0.19) (0.17)
N 79 79 75 51 48 61 61 59 40 39
Panel B 2SLS
with gove®ect
lnnatcap 0:25¤¤ 0:19¤¤ 0.2 0:18 0:12
(0.1) (0.1) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12)
lnsubsoil 0:16¤¤¤ 0:13¤¤¤ 0:13¤¤¤ 0:15¤¤¤ 0:16¤¤¤
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
gove®ect 0:45¤ 0:65¤¤¤ 0:59¤¤ 0:90¤¤¤ 0:42 0:75¤¤¤ 0:91¤¤¤ 0:97¤¤¤ 0:94¤¤¤ 0:6¤
(0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.33) (0.38) (0.24) (0.21) (0.27) (0.24) (0.29)
lgdp70 ¡0:55¤¤¤¡0:56¤¤¤¡0:88¤¤¤¡0:78¤¤¤ ¡0:74¤¤ ¡0:90¤¤¤ ¡0:9¤¤¤ ¡1:02¤¤¤¡0:92¤¤¤¡0:67¤¤¤
(0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.26) (0.3) (0.21) (0.22) (0.2) (0.22) (0.2)
ethnic frac. ¡1:02¤¤¤ ¡0:48 ¡0:88¤¤ ¡0:65¤
(0.35) (0.40) (0.37) (0.36)
lpop70 0:15¤¤¤ 0:1¤ 0:13¤¤ 0:11¤¤
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
schooling 0:17¤¤ 0:16¤¤ 0:03 ¡0:01
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
openness ¡0:1 ¡0:15 ¡0:18 ¡0:25
(0.23) (0.2) (0.18) (0.16)
N 79 79 75 51 48 61 61 59 40 39
Notes: Dependent variable in 2SLS is log income growth 1970-2000. First stage regressions for insti-
tutional variables are not shown to save space. Standard errors in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ statistically
signi¯cant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. For detailed variable descriptions and sources
see Appendix B.
dogeneity. In addition, the magnitude of the institutional e®ect remains largely
unchanged with respect to the results of the simple OLS regressions reported
in Table 3. The robustness of these overall results is investigated below.
Robustness test The validity of our results depends on the assumption that
natural resource wealth has strong direct growth e®ects which are not due to
omitted variable bias. We check the robustness of the ¯ndings by adding further
control variables which have been found to in°uence economic growth in the
literature.18 The variables include ethnic fractionalisation on a scale from 0 to
1 (see Alesina et al., 2003); the log of initial population; the average years of
schooling of adults age 15 and over between 1970-2000 (Barro and Lee, 2001);
and the measure of economic openness developed by Sachs and Warner (1995b),
which has been used extensively in the resource curse literature. An alternative
measure of openness, de¯ned as the GDP share of total trades (exports plus
imports) between 1970-2000, was also used with slightly better results from a
18See Easterly and Levine (1997) for an early application of this method of testing robust-
ness.
17statistical point of view, but with no e®ect on the natural resource indicators.
Other economic control variables included government consumption and
investment as shares of GDP between 1970-2000; and the period averages of
¯nancial depth|i.e. the ratio of liquidity in an economy to its GDP|and
foreign direct investment. Further social controls were measures of language
and religious fractionalisation; a dummy variable derived from the Polity IV
database indicating whether a country experienced a regime transition or violent
change between 1970-2000; legal origin dummies; and the average mortality
between 1970-2000. Our results proved robust to all these additional variables,
as well (for convenience, only a selection of controls is presented; full results are
available upon request).
Overall, the estimations, reported in Table 7, show that our results change
very little with the inclusion of these variables. The estimations for the broad
natural resource measure, reported in columns (1)-(5), con¯rm that the in°u-
ence is positive but not overwhelming: the variable is not robust to the inclusion
of several of our controls. However, the results using our measure of per capita
subsoil wealth are very robust to additional controls; the positive e®ect remains
highly signi¯cant and essentially unchanged in its magnitude even when con-
trolling for all other e®ects simultaneously (column (10)). Note in particular
that the average level of schooling|as a proxy of the level of technology|does
not alter the positive growth e®ects of mineral wealth. We can reasonably as-
sume therefore that the results are not in°uenced by the quality and amount
of resource exploration in a given country, i.e. that our measures of resource
abundance are exogenous. There is also no large-country bias: including initial
population size does not change the ¯ndings for our resource estimates.
Our indicators of institutional quality, on the other hand, are no longer sig-
ni¯cant when including all control variables together, which is not surprising
as there is probably some multicollinearity between the variables. Interest-
ingly, not all of the variables emphasised in previous research prove signi¯cant
in our estimations. Ethnic fractionalisation has a signi¯cant negative e®ect
on growth (when considered alone, columns (1) and (6)), con¯rming the re-
sults of Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003). The years of
schooling have a signi¯cant positive growth e®ect (in the general natural cap-
ital estimations in columns (2) and (5)), as found in the human capital and
growth literature. Population size also positively in°uences the average growth
over the period. The measure for economic openness, however, is not signi¯-
cantly related to economic growth. In the ¯rst-stage regressions (not shown),
our main instrument for institutional quality|latitude|consistently remained
highly signi¯cant, while the natural resources measures again had no signi¯cant
e®ect on institutions.
184 Conclusions
This paper re-examines two main aspects of the resource curse literature, namely
the widespread use of Sachs and Warner's (1995a) measure of resource abun-
dance based on primary export data, and the limited attention paid to institu-
tional quality in growth with natural resources. Using recently-developed mea-
sures of resource abundance which estimate natural capital in USD per capita,
as well as two indicators of institutional quality, we ¯nd new cross-country
evidence which challenges the resource curse hypothesis.
Results from both OLS and 2SLS estimations contradict most of the re-
source curse literature so far, showing that natural resources, and in particular
mineral resources, have a positive direct association with real GDP growth over
the period 1970-2000, even when controlling for the quality of institutions. In
addition, there is no evidence that resource abundance negatively a®ects in-
stitutional quality, contradicting the hypothesis of an indirect natural resource
curse, e.g. through rent-seeking behaviour. Interestingly however, the bene¯cial
growth e®ects seem to diminish as institutional quality improves, although they
remain strongly positive overall. The results are robust to controlling through
additional variables.
In sum, an abundance of natural resources may in fact be much less of
a curse and more of a boon for economic performance than often believed.
This conclusion suggests a di®erent perspective on the growth e®ects of natural
resources over the last thirty years. So far, the attempts to model the in°uence
of natural resource abundance on economic growth have not proven wholly
satisfactory; in addition to the possibility that resources may have positive
instead of the usually assumed growth e®ects, a theoretical explanation would
surely have to include the role of institutions in the growth process.
19A Appendix
Table A. Basic OLS regressions of natural resource abundance on growth
SW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lgdp70 0:4¤ 0:16¤ 0.04 -0.05
(0.22) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)






Adj.R2 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.11
N 97 70 79 61 70 79 61
Notes: Column (1) reports the basic result of Sachs and Warner (1995a) with log of per capita GDP
growth between 1970-1989 as the dependent variable. In columns (2)-(7) the dependent variable is log
of per capita GDP growth from 1970-2000. Results shown using SW's measure sxp, as well as logs of
World Bank indicators of subsoil and total natural capital (1994-2000 averages). Standard errors in
parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ statistically signi¯cant at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
20B Appendix
Table B1. Correlations between institutional quality measures: rule of law
ruleo°aw GLprights70 GLprights7000 Hprights95 Hprights9500
ruleo°aw 1.00 (158)
GLprights70 0.8 (48) 1.00 (48)
GLprights7000 0.84 (118) 0.92 (48) 1.00 (118)
Hprights95 ¡0:8 (95) ¡0:63 (38) ¡0:7 (84) 1.00 (96)
Hprights9500 ¡0:86 (151) ¡0:67 (48) ¡0:69 (116) 0:93 (95) 1.00 (153)
Notes: Number of observations in parentheses. All results are statistically signi¯cant at the 1-percent
level. ruleo°aw denotes average 1996-2000 World Bank measure of the rule of law. GLprights70
and GLprights7000 are measures of the legal system quality and property rights enforcement in 1970
and averaged over 1970-2000, respectively, taken from the dataset compiled by Gwartney and Lawson
(2005). They are measured on a scale of 0 (no legal system and property rights in place or enforced) to
10 (very well-developed legal system and fully enforced property rights). Hprights95 and Hprights9500
are measures for property right enforcement for 1995 (¯rst available year) and averaged over 1995-
2000, respectively. They are measured on a scale from 1 (fully enforced) to 5 (no enforcement) and
are taken from the Heritage Foundation dataset (Holmes et al., 2006).




burdelay 0:85 (58) 1.00 (58)
corrupt 0.76 (118) 0:85 (54) 1.00 (118)
Notes: Number of observations in parentheses. All results are statistically signi¯cant at the 1-percent
level. gove®ect denotes average 1996-2000 World Bank measure of government e®ectiveness. burdelay
is a measure of bureaucratic delays (average 1972-1995), scaled from 0 to 10 with low ratings indicating
higher levels of red tape (less e®ectiveness). corrupt is an indicator of government corruption, scaled
from 0 to 10 with low ratings indicating more corrupt government o±cials. The latter indicators are
taken from the dataset compiled by La Porta et al. (1999).
21C Appendix
Natural resource variables by country
Main World Bank (1997, 2005) natural resource abundance variables used in
estimations, measured in USD per capita. 1994-2000 averages shown; variables
used and listed only for countries for which data were available in both years.
Country Subsoil Tot. natural Country Subsoil Tot. natural
wealth capital wealth capital
Argentina 1886:5 10081:0 Malawi 832.5
Australia 10285:5 29753:5 Malaysia 5076.0 10461.5
Austria 357:5 7372:0 Mali 3498.5
Bangladesh 51.5 2035.5 Mauritania 4041.0
Benin 12.5 1631.5 Mauritius 941.0
Bolivia 787.0 5421.5 Mexico 4967.5 7561.5
Botswana 408.0 4401.5 Morocco 93.0 1907.0
Brazil 1309.0 6906.0 Mozambique 0.00 1094.5
Burkina Faso 1809.5 Namibia 953.0 4766.0
Burundi 2.0 1575.9 Nepal 5.0 2064.5
Cameroon 627.0 5766.5 Netherlands 2151.5 5439.5
Canada 12658.0 35680.5 New Zealand 2448.0 47158.0
Chad 3705.5 Nicaragua 4.5 2891.0
Chile 12692.0 Niger 0.5 7157.5
China 465.5 2446.5 Norway 34964.5 42524.0
Colombia 2193.0 6323.5 Pakistan 207.5 1624.0
Congo, Rep. of 4248.0 6875.0 Panama 5675.5
Costa Rica 8193.5 Paraguay 6181.0
C^ ote d'Ivoire 16.0 3455.5 Peru 682.0 4102.5
Denmark 2716.5 11408.0 Philippines 55.0 2139.5
Dominican Rep. 193.0 5778.0 Portugal 115.5 3834.5
Ecuador 3587.5 12223.5 Rwanda 1588.0
Egypt 937.0 2818.0 Senegal 32.0 3286.0
El Salvador 1031.0 South Africa 1229.0 3800.0
Finland 84.0 13687.5 Spain 95.0 5057.0
France 73.5 7227.5 Sri Lanka 0.0 2148.5
Gambia, The 1317.0 Sweden 336.5 11270.0
Germany 309.5 4297.5 Switzerland 0.0 4496.5
Ghana 37.5 1628.0 Thailand 274.5 5768.0
Greece 319.0 4882.0 Togo 63.5 1792.5
Guatemala 180.5 2345.5 Trinidad&Tobago 19794.5 21543.5
Guinea-Bissau 4914.0 Tunisia 1160.0 5154.5
Haiti 0.0 816.5 Turkey 195.0 3722.0
Honduras 62.0 3192.5 United Kingdom 2734.5 6053.5
India 205.5 2919.0 United States 5143.0 15626.0
Indonesia 1109.5 5476.0 Uruguay 12044.5
Ireland 457.5 14157.0 Venezuela 19131 24023.5
Italy 260.5 4039.0 Zambia 247.0 3634.5























natcap Log of the average total natural capital in 1994 and 2000, esti-
mated in USD per capita. The measure includes subsoil assets,




subsoil Log of the average subsoil assets in 1994 and 2000, estimated
in USD per capita. The measure includes energy resources
(oil, natural gas, hard coal, lignite) and other mineral resources




nonfuelmin Aggregate production in tonnes of 52 non-fuel minerals, rang-
ing from aluminium to zirconium. With the exception of a few
countries where series started in 1971-1974, data is for 1970.
Variables used in estimations include total tonnes, tonnes per
capita, and weighted by real GDP.
IGS
fuelmin Aggregate production in tonnes of coal, petroleum, and natu-
ral gas. With the exception of a few countries where coal and
petroleum series started in 1971-1974, data is for 1970. Variables
used in estimations include total tonnes, tonnes per capita, and
weighted by real GDP.
IGS and BP
min nonfuelmin+fuelmin IGS and BP
sxp Primary exports over GDP in 1971. SW
ruleo°aw Measures the average score of the quality of contract enforce-
ment, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
crime and violence between 1996-2000. Recalibrated to assume
values between zero (worst) and 5 (best).
Kaufmann et
al. (2005)
gove®ect Measures the average score of the quality of the bureaucracy
and of public services between 1996-200. Recalibrated to assume
values between zero (worst) and 5 (best).
Kaufmann et
al. (2005)
lgdp70 Log of real GDP per capita in 1970. Penn World
Tables 6.1
latitude Absolute value of latitude of a country on a scale of 0 to 1. La Porta et
al. (1999)
polity70 Political regime measure ranging from ¡10 (institutionalised au-
tocracy) to 10 (institutionalised democracy). Transition periods
are smoothed, anarchy is assigned score 0, and foreign "inter-






Measure of ethnic fractionalisation ranging from 0 (least frac-
tionalised) to 1 (extremely fractionalised) based on racial or




lpop70 Population in 1970 (logs). Penn World
Tables 6.1




openness Measure of openness, de¯ned as the fraction of years during pe-
riod 1965-1990 in which the country is rated as an open economy
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